

LOYALISM vs. REVOLUTION?
THREE HISPANIC AUTOCRATS COMPARED

Alfred G. Cuzán

Last revision: 8/31/2020

Key Words: loyalist, revolutionary, Franco, Castro, Pinochet

Abstract

In the course of two decades, Mostafa Rejai and Kay Phillips studied around two hundred political leaders, classifying them into two types, “loyalists” and “revolutionaries.” In this paper, their work is summarized and evaluated in light of detailed case studies of three Hispanic autocrats, Francisco Franco, Augusto Pinochet, and Fidel Castro. The first two, both career military men, exhibit most of the characteristics of the “loyalist” while Fidel Castro fits the “revolutionary” profile almost perfectly. The study raises a number of conceptual and methodological questions and concludes with some suggestions for further research along the lines suggested by the original authors.

Introduction.

Rejai and Phillips (1973, 1979, 1983, 1988, 1993, 1996, 1997,1998) developed and tested what they termed a “situational” or “interactional” theory of leadership in which individual attributes (place of birth, family life, ethnicity, psychology, education, father’s and own occupation, religion, ideology, skills) and circumstances (economic or political crisis, war) converge in the making of leaders. They tested their model in successive comparative studies of the biographies of hundreds of military and political leaders,

including American presidents, revolutionaries, and loyalists. Their subjects spanned four centuries and several continents. In this paper, their findings are evaluated in light of three case studies, all Hispanic autocrats, in order to assess how well they fit the situational framework. The results are consistent with the original findings, even as they raise questions about conceptualization regarding “loyalism” and “crisis.”

Leaders: Loyalists and Revolutionaries

Generally, revolutionary leaders hailed from a city or, if from a rural area, were exposed to urban life early on. They were the first or last son born into a large family from the majority ethnic and religious portion of the population, and enjoyed a tranquil family life. They attained power in middle age, usually in their 40s or 50s. About half of them belonged to the middle class and another twenty percent to the upper class, and attended college or university. Yet, at a young age, the typical revolutionist turned atheist, internalizing a radical ideology, and became a fervent nationalist and warrior for social justice. They were vain and egotistical, and preached if not practiced asceticism and a Spartan lifestyle. Traveling widely, they came into contact with other cultures and languages, becoming cosmopolitan, and wrote on a wide range of topics, from philosophy, art, and literature to revolutionary theory and tactics. The scope of their interests qualified them for membership in the *intelligentsia*, by which is meant dilettantes who dabble in word or deed in sundry subjects without excelling at any of them. Their view of the individual in society was, one might say, Rousseauian. That is, they were optimistic about human nature but equivocal or ambivalent toward their own country, for its institutions conditioned their feelings. As for other states, their

perception was Manichean, seeing only friends and enemies. Of course, the totality of the revolutionaries' views and activities made them marginal to their own society and culture. Frustrated in their effort at public recognition of the worth of their vision of a just society, they opted for violence to acquire the political power necessary to implement it.

By contrast, “loyalists” are leaders who stand in opposition to the revolutionaries at a time of crisis, defending the status quo against assaults. What is most interesting about these leaders is that they shared many of the same psycho-socio-economic-demographic traits and family background of the revolutionaries.¹ They, too, came mostly from the middle class to upper class, were well educated, familiar with other countries and cultures, and members of the intelligentsia. Where they differed was on age at the time they reached the higher ranks of the hierarchy (more of them were in their 60s), on ideology and religiosity, and on the occupation of the father. In contrast to the revolutionary, they had a dark view of human nature but were optimistic about their

¹ Incidentally, James Kirby Martin (1973) found that executives in late colonial and revolutionary America, whether loyalist or revolutionary, also were wealthier, better educated, were far less likely to be employed in agriculture and far more likely to be in one of the professions, especially the law, than the general population. There were proportionately fewer revolutionaries in the top tier of wealth, and more lawyers among the professionals. Interestingly, more revolutionaries hailed from old families than the late colonial or loyalist executives, and at least in some colonies there were some differences in religious affiliation between the revolutionaries and the rest.

own country. Like the revolutionary, they were nationalistic, but not motivated by a passion for social justice and, unlike the revolutionary, they remained faithful to their religion. The father of the typical loyalist was in government service, the military, a member of a profession, employed in banking or industry (but see below), or was a member of the landed gentry. Loyalists themselves were more likely to have pursued a career in full-time government service while no revolutionary did so. Thus, loyalists grew up close to sources of power and prestige while revolutionaries hankered after them, taking opportunistic advantage of promising situations to seize them. In sum, revolutionaries and loyalists had similar backgrounds. The main differences between them were ideological and situational. They had contrasting visions of the good society and of religion, and had differential access to political power, the future loyalist having grown within elite circles with political influence while the revolutionary did not. Thus, at a time of political or economic crisis, loyalist and revolutionary found themselves at opposite sides of the barricades.

A third application of the situational model took up 45 military leaders (Rejai and Phillips, 1996, 1998). Like the revolutionaries and loyalists, the subjects spanned four centuries and several continents, and in general shared the same psycho-social-economic-traits as the other two types. They were mostly middle class in origin, drawn from their country's ethnic and religious majority, sufficiently educated² to qualify as

² The education obtained in a country's military academy was considered comparable to that of college or university.

members of the intelligentsia. The, too, were vain and egotistical. In contrast to revolutionaries and loyalists, however, “middle children” were overrepresented. Also, military leaders were not a cosmopolitan lot.³ Unsurprisingly, in the vast majority of cases the military was their only occupation. As in the case of some loyalists, the typical military leader’s father was a military man or engaged in one of the professions and, again like most loyalists, they held their native country in high regard. Also, they espoused an “indigenous ideology” characterized as “nationalist” or “rightist.” Their view of other peoples or states was Manichean, a view manifested in at least in some cases in an imperialistic desire to expand their country’s power at the expense of others. On the other hand, like the revolutionaries, military leaders experienced a sense of deprivation and marginality, having attained less power and influence than what they thought was their due. Thus, although not equidistant, the military leader stood somewhere between the loyalist and the revolutionary. Closest to the loyalist in terms of ideology and proximity to power, military leaders shared the revolutionary’s frustrations regarding their place in society.

Having, with the aid of country experts, classified leaders as either loyalist or revolutionary, Rejai and Phillips used discriminant analysis to sort out the effect of 17 variables measuring leaders’ characteristics or background. The results were encouraging. Forty out of 50 revolutionaries were correctly predicted and 39 out of 50 loyalists were, as well, for an overall prediction rate of almost 80%.

³ Official missions abroad or military excursions into other countries was not counted as “foreign travel.”

One Revolutionary, Two Loyalists?

Francisco Franco (1892-1975), Fidel Castro (1926-2016), and Augusto Pinochet (1915-2006) all were born in a place and into a family removed from the center of political power and social prestige, yet at a time of political crisis they all managed to take over their respective states, remaking each in their own image. In this section, the main outlines of their biographies,⁴ the crises that brought them to the fore, and the regimes they founded are sketched. A summary of the historical highlights is displayed in Table 1.

.....

Table 1 about here

.....

Pinochet and Castro were first-born sons, although Castro of a second, illegitimate union between the father and a maid, a union that was in time legalized after the father was divorced from his first wife. Franco and Castro both had conflictual relations with their fathers: Franco because his progenitor, Nicolás, abandoned the family when the son was still a child and Castro probably on account of his origins. By contrast, Pinochet's father was "best friend and wise counselor" (Quoted in Vial 2002, Volume I: 24). Franco adored his mother but not Castro, who seemed at best indifferent to both

⁴ For biographical information, see Payne (2014) and Preston (1994) on Franco, Quirk (1993) on Castro, and Vial (2002) on Pinochet. Vial was "one of the [Chile's] most distinguished historians" (Puryear, 1994, p. 25).

parents. Franco and Pinochet were happily married whereas Castro was divorced by his first wife upon discovering an extramarital affair with a socialite.

Both Franco's and Pinochet's parents were relatively poor relations of a provincial "aristocracy." Franco's ancestors had served the Spanish navy for generations, whereas Pinochet's parents descended from a landowning clan from southern Chile whose founder arrived from France in the colonial era. Franco's father was a member of the Quartermaster Corp of the Navy and Pinochet's owned a small business in the port city of Valparaíso. Both Franco and Pinochet pursued a military career; they graduated and in time taught or directed the country's military academy. By contrast, Castro was a first-generation Cuban. His father, a Galician like Franco, had served in a Spanish cavalry regiment during the Spanish-American war. After the war the elder Castro returned to Spain, but not long thereafter returned to the island nation, settling in Oriente province, the farthest away from the capital. There, by dint of hard work and shrewd business deals, he made himself into a rich landowner, though never losing his rustic ways. Castro graduated from the best secondary school in the country, the Jesuit-run Belén. Located in the capital, it was attended by the scions of the country's elite, among whom Castro fit rather uneasily. Upon graduation, Castro studied law at the University of Havana, a profession later abandoned for politics and, later, revolution.

All three autocrats enjoyed leisure activities requiring physical exertion, such as hunting or fishing in the case of Castro and Franco, and sports, target-shooting and horseback riding in Pinochet's. All three enjoyed reading history, biography, or

geography. Franco had an artistic streak. Pinochet was the most scholarly of the three, having published books on geopolitics and geography during his military career. Only Castro was a spellbinding orator. Franco and Castro risked their lives in combat, but only Franco fought at the head of his troops and only he was wounded, in a skirmish with insurgents in Spanish Morocco. Pinochet suffered scratches in a foiled attempt on his life. A little over a year after a *coup* against the democratic government led by former dictator and president Fulgencio Batista, Castro organized an attack on the Moncada Barracks in Santiago de Cuba, the country's second-largest city, in Oriente, his home province. Moncada was a bloody failure that, like Hitler's Beer Hall Putsch, made the 27 year old revolutionary famous even as it cost him nearly two years in prison (de la Cova 2007). Throughout Pinochet's military career Chile was at peace, so he never saw combat first-hand; however, he was fascinated and seriously studied the War of the Pacific in which Chile defeated both Peru and Bolivia.

Upon seizing power Castro proceeded to upend the country's social, economic, and political structures. He expropriated all domestic and international properties of any size, substituting a thoroughgoing "socialist" economy and a one-party, totalitarian state, with him as "maximum leader" and his brother Raúl as next in line. He imposed a reign of terror, processing tens of thousands through a veritable Gulag of prisons and camps, sent thousands to the firing squad, and drove hundreds of thousands out of the country. Castro launched an assault on the Catholic Church, expelling foreign born clergy, imprisoning priests, confiscating Catholic schools and seminaries, and denying parishes resources for the upkeep of churches. For something like two decades

Christmas celebrations were abolished. Not until the 1990s, after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, did the regime seek an accommodation with the Church, welcoming Pope John Paul II to the island. Internationally, from the very beginning Castro thrust Cuba into the thick of the Cold War. Not on the side not of the United States, Cuba's erstwhile ally and most important trading partner, but on that of the USSR. This provoked a confrontation between the two "super powers" in October 1962. Moreover, Castro sowed guerrilla movements over most of Latin America, and shipped tens of thousands of troops to do battle abroad, especially in Africa, in Angola and Ethiopia in particular. Naturally, the United States took umbrage at all this. It tried to overthrow Castro, training, equipping, and transporting a small force of Cuban exiles (1,500) to the Bay of Pigs in 1961, supplying anti-Castro guerrillas operating in the Escambray Mountains of central Cuba during the 1960s, and allegedly trying to assassinate him. Although in its feud with Castro Washington was initially supported by its Western allies and much of Latin America, over the years the Cuban autocrat turned the propaganda war around, portraying himself and his regime as the little David under siege from the American Goliath. In due course the United Nations began to perform an annual ritual of denouncing the American "blockade" of the island, a reference to the commercial embargo imposed in the early 1960s, and placed Castro's representatives in its Human Rights Council, of all places.⁵ Even the Organization of the American States,

⁵ See the criticism of such incongruity in Werlau (2016).

which includes in its charter a requirement that member states be democratic, lobbied hard to bring back Cuba into the fold, but Raúl Castro scorned the invitation.

What Castro did in Cuba was precisely the kind of outcome that both Franco and Pinochet feared would come of their countries if the coalitions of socialists and communists that had been recently elected by plurality vote was allowed to consolidate power.⁶ Both hesitated almost until the last moment before they cast their lot with other conspirators who had taken the lead in hatching a military uprising against the second Spanish Republic and Allende's *Unidad Popular* administration, respectively. Then, when circumstances opened opportunities to strike, each strategically seized a key position from which to vault into absolute power. In the aftermath of the conflict, the three-year long Spanish Civil War and the days-long coup in Chile the dictators treated the vanquished enemy harshly, executing, imprisoning, "disappearing" or exiling thousands in the case of Pinochet, tens of thousands in Franco's case. Neither military strong man sought to restore the *status quo ante*. Rather, each embarked on a program to reconstruct the country according to a different vision. Like Castro, they both abhorred parliamentary politicking, which they blamed for the political crisis. Franco took over the Falange, a rightist populist party, and used it mainly to mobilize support for his regime while Pinochet banned all political parties and even scotched plans to organize a political movement on his behalf.

⁶ On the crisis in Spain, where a socialist-communist-anarchist coalition defeated a right of center coalition and then proceeded to cancel the election of several of the latter's deputies, see Payne (2012); on Chile, see Puryear (1994) Chapter 2, and Vial (2005).

Franco's original vision was that of a corporatist model that borrowed from Mussolini's Italy while retaining a strong Catholic orientation under a future monarchical restoration. Only later, under the influence of Opus Dei ministers, did he switch to a developmentalist, market-oriented model that raised living standards and, to the caudillo's chagrin, liberated the culture and, against his intention, ended up paving the way for a revived and democratized parliamentary constitutional monarchy after his death. As for Pinochet, his vision was that of a "protected democracy" supplied by a market economy. He undid not only Allende's socialist policies but several decades of progressive statist inroads into the economy, turning Chile into arguably the most capitalistic country of South America. In both cases, the relation with the Catholic Church was a mixed bag. Both Franco and Pinochet sought the support of the Church for their anti-communist crusade. Franco was more successful in this regard, at least initially, no doubt on account of the persecution that the Church had endured under the Second Republic. But in time the clergy turned increasingly critical, protesting human rights abuses, as it did in Chile, only there it did so earlier in the life of the regime, where it sheltered dissident intellectuals and politicians (Puryear 1994). Both dictators were bitter about what they viewed as the Church's betrayal.

Internationally, both Franco and Pinochet avoided being drawn into war. During World War II Franco flirted with throwing his lot with the Axis powers, going as far as sending a "volunteer" force, the Blue Division, to fight for Germany on the Eastern Front, but drew back as the wind began to blow the other way. Also, although reluctantly, he gave up his dream of renewing Spain's African empire, withdrawing

Spanish forces under pressure from territories claimed by Morocco and Equatorial Guinea while retaining the urban footholds of Ceuta and Melilla. For his part, Pinochet managed to sidestep a military encounter over the Beagle Channel Islands with Argentina, then ruled by a truculent military junta, luring the Vatican to serve as mediator. As far as is known, he did not respond in kind when a huge arsenal of weapons stealthily shipped from Cuba for a planned insurrection was discovered, or when a group of Chileans trained and armed in Cuba staged a spectacular assassination attempt from which he escaped with only scratches on his hands. Both Franco and Pinochet faced strong and sustained international criticism from abroad, including ritual denunciations at the United Nations, diplomatic pressure from the democracies, and organized propaganda campaigns from the USSR and its front organizations in the West. Franco beat back guerrilla attacks infiltrated from France and withstood a global economic boycott after World War II, and Pinochet had to contend with terrorists trained and supplied from Cuba and annual denunciations of his regime at the United Nations. Actually, just as Castro used American opposition to marshal domestic and international support, so did Pinochet exploit international criticism to his advantage, stoking Chilean nationalism on the regime's behalf.

Franco ruled for almost four decades, ceding power to the man he had made king, Juan Carlos, only when he was at death's door. Castro's nearly half-century reign, from 1959 to 2007, was the longest in the history of independent Latin America, indeed one of the longest in modern times. When he fell ill, he transferred power to his brother Raúl and lived almost another decade. Only Pinochet risked his power in a referendum,

which put an end to his 16-year long dictatorship, the shortest of the three. However, as provided in the 1980 Constitution his team had designed and for which they engineered approval in a referendum, Pinochet remained Commander in Chief of the Army for another eight years, and then as a former president he took his seat as Senator for life, again as provided in the Constitution. But in 1998, on a trip to London, he was put on house arrest while the courts ruled on an extradition request from Spain, where an activist judge wanted to put him on trial for human rights abuses. The ordeal lasted two years. The British government finally decided against extradition on account of Pinochet's health, as he was suffering from diabetes and mild dementia. Back in Chile, he faced additional attempts to put him on trial, although he managed to avoid them. After cremation, his ashes were retained by his family, whereas Castro's (who was cremated) and until recently Franco's⁷ housed in national landmarks.

Loyalists vs. Revolutionary?

Table 2 compares all three autocrats on leadership traits. In this and the following two tables, the traits are hierarchically ordered according to the evidentiary support found for Rejai and Phillips' situational model. In column 1, features considered critical in the model are in caps; those for which there was some evidence are in italics; and those in normal type are those for which evidence was sparse or absent. Also, in columns 2-4 notations in caps indicate that the characteristic is strong. Again, all

⁷ Raphael Minder, "Spain Exhumes and Reburies Remains of Franco," Franco's Remains are Exhumed and Reburied after Bitter Battle," *New York Times*, October 25, 2019, p. A8.

information displayed in the tables was extracted from the biographical sources cited earlier.

Observe that Pinochet unambiguously displays all seven “critical” leadership characteristics, Franco six, and Castro five. All three were “vain, narcissistic, egotistical,” imbued with a sense of mission or “destiny,” and emerged at a time of political crisis. Franco and Pinochet excelled at organizational skills and Castro in verbal communication. Of the seven lesser traits, denoted in italics, Franco exhibits four, Pinochet five, and Castro six. Castro further displays all three weak traits, those for which evidence had been sparse in the testing of the model, two of them, strongly, Franco three, and Pinochet, one. Altogether, both Franco and Pinochet fit 13 of the 17 attributes included in Table 1, or 71%, while Castro agrees with 15, or 88%. Observe that Castro scores strongly on five of the traits, but Franco and Pinochet on only 1, and it is the same for both (organizational skills). In sum, although all three autocrats fit the leadership model’s critical characteristics traits well, Castro’s overall score is highest. The relative ratings are in line with their career paths. Franco and Pinochet were professional military men who for most of their lives served as subordinates to higher authority, shunning political involvement. In fact, Pinochet had the reputation as a reliable “second,” one who got done efficiently and speedily what his superiors ordered him to do. Neither took the lead in organizing the conspiracy against the government and both were reluctant latecomers to the uprising. By contrast, with remarkable audacity 27 year old Castro leaped to the forefront of the struggle against Batista,

leading a group of more than 100 men on a disastrous attack on an Army base, a bloody failure that launched his independent political career (de la Cova. 2007).

.....

Table 2 about here

.....

Table 3 presents 18 loyalist traits. Of the six critical variables, Franco scores positively on five (83%), Pinochet on four (67%), and Castro one (17%). Of seven variables in italics, Franco and Pinochet satisfy about half, but Castro again only one. And on the last tier, Castro fits none, Franco three, and Pinochet four, including one (tranquil family life), strongly. Altogether, of the 18 variables in the table, Franco scores positively on 12 (66%), Pinochet on 11 (61%) and Castro on 2 (11%). Thus, it is clear that the loyalist model does not fit Castro. As for Franco and Pinochet, they score highly on the critical variables, which is not surprising, given the military careers they chose for themselves. Still, the fact that they did not match the variables in the second tier nearly as well suggests that there may have lurked under the surface of their personalities or background some potential for breaking with their loyalist past. Again, recall that in their study of military leaders, it was found that they shared with revolutionaries a sense of relative deprivation.

.....

Table 3 about here

.....

Table 4 exhibits the 12 characteristics that in the situational model were conjectured to be correlated with revolutionary leaders. Only distance from power turned out to be critical; partial evidence was found for an additional 11. Observe that the one critical variable, remoteness from power, neatly discriminates between Franco and Pinochet, on the one hand, and Castro on the other. At the time of the political crisis, the last year of the socialist government in Spain and Chile, General Franco and, especially General Pinochet, whom Allende had appointed Commander in Chief of the Army, occupied positions of power. By contrast, at the time of Fulgencio Batista's *coup* against the 12-year democratic government in Cuba, Castro was a young lawyer with an unsavory past⁸ who was campaigning for a legislative seat. A year later, he organized an attack on a military base far from the capital. And, in the two years leading to his seizing control of the country in a revolution, Castro was ensconced in a mountain hideout in eastern Cuba as distant from the center of power as one could be. On the next tier of 11 variables, Castro fits 9, and Franco and Pinochet 4 each. Lastly, Castro meets the last variable on the table, for he was only 33 years old when he rode into Havana on top of a tank, whereas Franco was 47 and Pinochet 58. Altogether, on the model of a revolutionary, Castro rates 83%, and Franco and Pinochet, 33%.

.....

Table 4 about here

.....

⁸ At the University of Havana Castro had joined a political gang and been implicated in two murders.

Discussion

The evidence in Tables 2-4 are mostly consistent with the situational model. All three autocrats fit the leader profile well; Franco and Pinochet conform to the loyalist model; and Castro corresponds almost perfectly to the prototype of a revolutionary. Also, the careers of Franco and Pinochet show the importance of Rejai and Phillips' qualification that the leader's type is applicable only to the time leading up to "a revolutionary's *power seizure* or a loyalist's *assuming highest office*," not what the leader does afterward (Rejai and Phillips 1988: xvi; emphasis in the original). Franco and Pinochet did not just defend or seek a return to the *status quo ante*, which they blamed for the crisis. Rather, they proceeded to revolutionize their countries in their own way. Although neither model survived their death or retirement, something did remain of what they constructed: the restored monarchy in Spain, a second round in the election of the president in Chile, and a more prosperous economy in both. As for Castro, he turned from revolutionary to defender of *his* status quo, doggedly resisting all pressure from friend and foe to enact political reforms and deeding the regime to his brother in the dynastic tradition of the Somozas of Nicaragua or the Trujillos of the Dominican Republic.

Nevertheless, these case studies bring into relief some problems with the situational model. Although the meaning of revolution or revolutionary is clear, and evidently is exemplified by Fidel Castro, some ambiguity attaches to the concept of loyalism. Franco and Pinochet illustrate the problem. Their "loyalism" was highly qualified at best. They were loyal to something, to be sure, but not exactly to the system

that was under mortal threat by the socialist government they overthrew. That very system, they thought, had paved the way for the crisis, and they sought to replace it with something sturdier. So what, exactly, was the subject of their loyalty? Franco was a monarchist at heart, although he did not think much of the most recent occupant of the throne, Alfonso XIII or of his son and presumed claimant to the throne, Don Juan. Franco was enamored of Spain's glorious past and wished to restore its empire even as he yielded most of the little that remained of it. He flirted with fascism, something contrary to Spain's own traditions. He was a loyal Catholic, and granted the Church a number of privileges, including a role in public education, but in the end the Church turned against him. What was dearest to Pinochet was the military as an institution. The 1980 constitution included a provisions granting it extraordinary powers that were incompatible with liberal democracy. In fact, these were amended away under the elected governments that followed the military regime. What is clear is that both Franco and Pinochet were anti-communist and anti-Soviet,⁹ abhorred Marxism in all its forms, and set about to expurgate it from their countries. That was a principal motivation for their joining the military conspiracy and justifying their power after victory. But again, the object of their loyalism is rather elusive. They were nationalists, but their conception of their nation's true essence was rooted in a romantic interpretation of their respective

⁹ In the last decade or so of Franco's regime there was a thaw in the relationship with the USSR, especially in the area of trade, although restoration of full diplomatic recognition and exchange of ambassadors did not take place until after Franco's death. In the case of Pinochet the relation with the USSR was uniformly hostile throughout.

histories, a version that rejected the trajectories their politics had followed for the previous half century, at least.

Discussion and Conclusion

In this article, the principal findings of a situational model on the characteristics of leaders exercising political and military power were summarized and evaluated in light of the career paths of three Hispanic autocrats. These case studies show that the three leaders do fit, in the main, the respective profile of “loyalist” or “revolutionary.”

However, as noted, the concept loyalism or loyalist is ambiguous. This can lead to errors in classification. Cuba’s Fulgencio Batista is a case in point. Rejai and Phillips had classified Batista, *a priori*, as “loyalist.” But, in the empirical analysis, Batista fell among failed predictions of the model. It is not clear why Rejai and Phillips had expected that Batista would fit the loyalist profile. Batista was born of mixed raced parents in a small town far away from the capital city. A non-commissioned officer, he was only 32 years old when he participated in the so-called “Revolt of the Sergeants,” one of the events that led to the overthrow of president-cum-dictator Gerardo Machado in 1933 (Aguilar 1972; Argote-Freyre 2006). In a few months he captured the leadership of the army and became the man behind the throne, making and unmaking puppet presidents until 1940 when, having allowed a free election to a Constituent Assembly, he ran for president under the new charter. His cabinet included members of Cuba’s communist party, the *Partido Socialista Popular*. The Constitution prohibited immediate reelection, requiring a former president to sit out two terms before attempting a comeback. At the end of the presidential term, the designated successor

having lost the presidential election, Batista turned power over to the victor, one of the provisional presidents whom Batista had displaced in the 1930s. Eight years later, Batista was back, trying to get elected to another term. In March 1952, trailing badly in the polls, he staged a *coup*. In the next six years Batista tried but failed to legitimize the regime. But in the face of a crescendo of opposition from a multi-class movement combined with a suspension of arms shipments from the United States, Batista fled the country on January 1, 1959. This cleared the way for Fidel Castro to appropriate the state and launch what a few had feared but most had not suspected, a communist revolution (Llerena 1978).

Another conceptual problem has to do with the notion of “crisis,” the situational fork in the road where loyalists and revolutionaries sort themselves out. In the model, it is treated as “exogenous,” whereas at least in some cases it is endogenous to the leader’s own actions. Again, Fulgencio Batista illustrates the point. It was by staging the *coup* that brought Batista back to power that which created the opportunity for Fidel Castro to stage a spectacular event, the Moncada attack, which catapulted the young revolutionary to prominence.

In conclusion, it is hoped that this article stimulates interest and further research into the situational model and the study of autocratic leadership in particular.

REFERENCES

- Aguilar, L. E. (1972). *Cuba 1933: Prologue to Revolution*. Cornell University Press.
- Argote-Freyre, F. (2006). *Fulgencio Batista. From Revolutionary to Strongman*. Rutgers University Press.
- De la Cova, A. R. (2007). *The Moncada Attack: Birth of the Cuban Revolution*. University of South Carolina Press.
- Llerena, M. (1978). *The Unsuspected Revolution: The Birth and Rise of Castroism*. Cornell University Press.
- Martin, J. K. (1973). *Men in Rebellion. Higher Governmental Leaders and the Coming of the American Revolution*. Rutgers University Press.
- Payne, S. G. (2012). *The Spanish Civil War*. Cambridge University Press
- _____. 2014. *Franco: A Personal and Political Biography*. University of Wisconsin Press.
- Preston, P. (1994). *Franco. A Biography*. New York: Basic Books.
- Puryear, J. M. (1994). *Thinking Politics. Intellectuals and Democracy in Chile, 1973-1988*. The Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Quirk, R. E. (1993). *Fidel Castro*. New York: Norton.
- Rejai, M. (1973). *The Strategy of Political Revolution*. Anchor Press.
- Rejai, M. and Phillips, K. (1979). *Leaders of Revolution*. SAGE Publications, Inc.
- _____. 1983. *World Revolutionary Leaders*. Rutgers University Press.
- _____. 1988. *Loyalists & Revolutionaries: Political Leaders Compared*. New York: Praeger.

- _____. 1993. *Demythologizing an Elite. American Presidents in Empirical, Comparative, and Historical Perspective*. With Warren L. Mason. Praeger.
- _____. 1996. *World Military Leaders: A Collective Comparative Analysis*. Praeger.
- _____. 1997. *Leaders and Leadership: An Appraisal of Theory and Research*. Praeger.
- Thomas, H. (1971). *Cuba or The Pursuit of Freedom*. Harper & Row.
- Vial, G. (2002). *Pinochet. La Biografía*. Two Volumes. Santiago, Chile: Empresa El Mercurio, S.A.P.
- _____. 2005. *Salvador Allende. El Fracaso de una Ilusión*. Centro de Estudios Bicentenario. Universidad Finis Terrae.
- Aguilar, Luis E. 1972. *Cuba 1933: Prologue to Revolution*. Cornell University Press.
- Argote-Freyre, Frank. 2006. *Fulgencio Batista. From Revolutionary to Strongman*. Rutgers University Press.
- Bailey, F. G. 1988. *Humbuggery and Manipulation: The Art of Leadership*. Cornell University Press.
- Blondel, Jean. 1980. *World Leaders: Heads of Government in the Postwar Period*. Sage Publications.
- De la Cova, Antonio Rafael. 2007. *The Moncada Attack: Birth of the Cuban Revolution*. University of South Carolina Press.
- Llerena, Mario. 1978. *The Unsuspected Revolution: The Birth and Rise of Castroism*. Cornell University Press.

- Martin, James Kirby. 1973. *Men in Rebellion. Higher Governmental Leaders and the Coming of the American Revolution*. Rutgers University Press.
- Payne, Stanley G. 2012. *The Spanish Civil War*. Cambridge University Press
- _____. 2014. *Franco: A Personal and Political Biography*. University of Wisconsin Press.
- Phillips, Kay and Mostafa Rejai. 1994. "Women as Leaders: A Research Note," *Journal of Political and Military Sociology*, 22 (Winter): 343-350.
- Preston, Paul. 1994. *Franco. A Biography*. New York: Basic Books.
- Puryear, Jeffrey M. 1994. *Thinking Politics. Intellectuals and Democracy in Chile, 1973-1988*. The Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Quirk, Robert E. 1993. *Fidel Castro*. New York: Norton.
- Rejai, Mostafa. 1973. *The Strategy of Political Revolution*. Anchor Press.
- Rejai, Mostafa and Phillips, Kay. 1979. *Leaders of Revolution*. SAGE Publications, Inc.
- _____. 1983. *World Revolutionary Leaders*. Rutgers University Press.
- _____. 1988. *Loyalists & Revolutionaries: Political Leaders Compared*. New York: Praeger.
- _____. 1993. *Demythologizing an Elite. American Presidents in Empirical, Comparative, and Historical Perspective*. With Warren L. Mason. Praeger.
- _____. 1996. *World Military Leaders: A Collective Comparative Analysis*. Praeger.
- _____. 1997. *Leaders and Leadership: An Appraisal of Theory and Research*. Praeger.

_____. 1998. Comparing Leaders: An Interactional Theory. *Journal of Leadership & Organizational Studies*, 5 (1): 62-71

Thomas, Hugh. 1971. *Cuba or The Pursuit of Freedom*. Harper & Row.

Vial, G.. 2002. *Pinochet. La Biografía*. Two Volumes. Santiago, Chile: Empresa El Mercurio, S.A.P.

_____. 2005. *Salvador Allende. El Fracaso de una Ilusión*. Centro de Estudios Bicentenario. Universidad Finis Terrae.

Werlau, M. C. 2016. "Cuba and the United States Human Rights Council." UN Watch, October 7. Available at <https://www.unwatch.org/cuban-activist-un-obvious-cuba-not-belong-un-human-rights-council/>

Table 1. Politically Relevant Events, by Year: Spain, Cuba, Chile

| Year | Spain |
|---------|---|
| 1892 | Birth of Francisco Franco Bahamonde. |
| 1931 | Proclamation of 2 nd Republic; King Alfonso XIII leaves for France. |
| 1936-39 | Military uprising— Civil War—victory of the Nationalists; start of Franco’s dictatorship. |
| 1969 | Franco, acting as Regent for the Crown, named Juan Carlos de Borbón as his heir-apparent. |
| 1973 | Assassination of long-time Franco collaborator and recently appointed Prime Minister Luis Carrero Blanco. |
| 1975 | Death of Franco. |
| 1976 | King Juan Carlos appoints Adolfo Suárez to head new government. Law of Political Reform enabling the dismantling of Franco’s regime approved in referendum. |
| 1978 | New Constitution establishing a constitutional monarchy and parliamentary regime approved by the voters |
| | Cuba |
| 1902 | Independence after four years of U.S. military occupation following the Spanish-American War. |
| 1926 | Birth of Fidel Castro Ruz. |
| 1933 | Revolution overthrows president Gerardo Machado. |
| 1933-40 | Strongman Fulgencio Batista rules behind the throne. |
| 1940 | Last Cuban Constitution drafted by a multi-party Constituent Assembly following free elections; election of Batista as president. |
| 1940-52 | Democratic regime. |
| 1952 | Overthrow of democratic regime by former strongman turned president Fulgencio Batista. |
| 1953 | Fidel Castro launches disastrous attack on Moncada Barracks on 26 th of July, the date after which his movement was named. |
| 1954-55 | Fidel Castro imprisoned; granted amnesty; leaves for Mexico. |
| 1956 | Fidel Castro lands a small expeditionary force in Oriente Province, retreats to the Sierra Maestra mountains. |
| 1959 | Fulgencio Batista flees; Fidel Castro enters Havana; start of Castro’s dictatorship. |
| 2002 | Castro regime claims 99% of the electorate signs petition declaring the country’s socialist regime “eternal.” |
| 2007 | Having fallen ill, Fidel Castro transfers power to his brother Raúl. |
| 2016 | Death of Fidel Castro. |
| | Chile |
| 1915 | Birth of Augusto Pinochet Ugarte. |
| 1932 | Constitutional rule restored after brief military dictatorship. |
| 1946-70 | Four six-year terms completed by presidents of different parties. |
| 1970 | Salvador Allende, standard-bearer of a socialist-communist coalition, the <i>Alianza Popular</i> , is elected president in a three-way |

- race with 37% of the vote.
- 1970-73 Political polarization, skyrocketing inflation accompany socialist policies.
- 1973 Overthrow of Allende's government; start of Pinochet's dictatorship.
- 1980 Approval of new constitution by referendum.
- 1988 Pinochet loses plebiscite that would have allowed him another eight years as president.
- 1989 Patricio Alwyn, Christian Democratic standard-bearer of *Concertación* opposition coalition, elected president.
- 1989-98 Pinochet continues to serve as Commander-in-Chief of the Army as provided by 1980 Constitution, which was amended in a democratic direction. The second round of a presidential election is left unchanged.
- 1998 Pinochet takes seat for life in Senate as provided in the Constitution.
- 1998-00 On a trip to London, Pinochet is placed in house arrest in response to extradition request from Spain
- 2002-06 Repeated efforts to try Pinochet in Chile fail.
- 2005 Another round of democratizing constitutional amendments.
- 2006 Death of Pinochet.

Table 2. Hypothesized Characteristics of Political Leaders

| TRAIT | FRANCO | PINOCHET | CASTRO |
|---|--------|----------|--------|
| MALE? | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| OLDEST, YOUNGEST, OR ONLY CHILD? | No | Yes | Yes# |
| BORN INTO MIDDLE OR UPPER-CLASS FAMILY? | Yes | Yes | No# |
| VAIN, NARCISSISTIC, EGOTISTICAL? | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| VERBAL SKILLS? | Yes | Yes | YES |
| ORGANIZATIONAL SKILLS? | YES | YES | Yes |
| DID LEADER EMERGE AT A TIME OF CRISIS? | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| <i>Issue of legal marriage?</i> | Yes | Yes | No# |
| <i>Belongs to mainstream ethnic and religious group?</i> | Yes | Yes | Yes# |
| <i>Born in a city? Or, if born and raised in rural environment, did he acquire early and sustained exposure to urban culture?</i> | Yes | Yes | YES |
| <i>Early involvement in national politics in urban area?</i> | No | No | Yes |
| <i>Foreign travel?</i> | No | Yes | YES |
| <i>Cosmopolitan background?</i> | No | No | Yes |
| <i>Patriotic and nationalistic?</i> | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Feeling of deprivation? | Yes | No | Yes |
| Feeling of marginalization? | Yes | No | YES |
| Highly educated in exclusive schools? | Yes | Yes | YES |

Notations:

Row in capital letters: trait considered by Rejai and Phillips to be a “critical variable.”

Row in italics: trait for which Rejai and Phillips found some evidence.

Row in normal type: trait for which Rejai and Phillips found insufficient evidence.

YES in caps: relative to the other(s), this leader exhibits the trait more strongly or vividly.

Trait partially or ambiguously held. See text.

Table 3. Hypothesized Loyalist Traits

| TRAIT | FRANCO | PINOCHET | CASTRO |
|--|--------|----------|--------|
| PROXIMITY TO POWER? | Yes# | Yes# | No |
| STABLE RELIGIOUS BELIEFS? | Yes | Yes | No |
| EARLY POLITICIZATION: AT HOME? | No | No | No |
| EARLY POLITICIZATION: AT SCHOOL? | Yes | No | Yes |
| PESSIMISTIC VIEW OF HUMAN NATURE? | Yes | Yes | No |
| LEADER EMPLOYED IN PUBLIC OFFICE? | Yes | Yes | No |
| <i>Upper-class background?</i> | No | No | No# |
| <i>Middle-class background?</i> | Yes | Yes | No# |
| <i>Travel-reinforced politicization?</i> | Yes | No | Yes |
| <i>High-status father in upper or middle class pursuits?</i> | No# | No | No |
| <i>Grew up in close proximity to power?</i> | No | No | No |
| <i>Middle-age when reaching highest office?</i> | Yes | Yes | No |
| <i>Internalized ideology of forefathers?</i> | Yes | Yes | No |
| Warm relation with father? | No | Yes | No |
| Free of harassment from authorities? | Yes# | Yes | No |
| Cosmopolitanism more limited by local or national perspective? | Yes | Yes | No |
| Stable and tranquil family life? | Yes# | YES | No |
| Uniformly optimistic about his own country? | No | No | No |

Notations:

Row in capital letters: trait considered a “critical variable.”

Row in italics: trait for which some evidence was found

Row in normal type: trait for which Rejai and Phillips found insufficient evidence.

YES in caps: relative to the other(s), this leader exhibits the trait more strongly or vividly.

Trait partially or ambiguously held. See text.

Table 4. Hypothesized Revolutionary Traits

| TRAIT | FRANCO | PINOCHET | CASTRO |
|--|--------|----------|--------|
| REMOTENESS FROM POWER? | No | No | Yes |
| <i>Oedipus complex?</i> | Yes | No | Yes |
| <i>Professional revolutionary, self-taught in military affairs?</i> | No | No | Yes |
| <i>Lower status father in middle or working class occupation?</i> | No | No | No# |
| <i>History of illegality, arrest, imprisonment?</i> | No | No | Yes |
| <i>Foreign travel, exposure to other societies and cultures?</i> | No | Yes | Yes |
| <i>Eclectic ideology, combining foreign and indigenous elements?</i> | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| <i>View toward country contingent on regime?</i> | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| <i>Lower-class background?</i> | No | No | No |
| <i>Stormy and conflict-riddled childhood?</i> | No | No | Yes |
| <i>Spent life in pursuit of access to influence and authority?</i> | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| <i>Reached highest office at relatively young age?</i> | No | No | Yes |

Notations:

Row in capital letters: trait considered by Rejai and Phillips to be a “critical variable.”

Row in italics: trait for which Rejai and Phillips found some evidence.

Row in normal type: trait for which Rejai and Phillips found insufficient evidence.

YES in caps: relative to the other(s), this leader exhibits the trait more strongly or vividly.

Trait partially or ambiguously held. See text.