

DICTATORSHIPS AND DOUBLE STANDARDS:
THE LATIN AMERICAN STUDIES ASSOCIATION ON CUBA

 Alfred G. Cuzán

 Professor of Political Science

 Department of Government

 The University of West Florida

 Pensacola, FL 32514

Foreword to the 2000 on-line "edition."

 This is a slightly revised and updated version of a monograph of the same title published by The Endowment for Cuban American Studies (Miami, FL: Paper #13). An earlier draft was presented at "The Role of Advocacy in the Classroom" conference, Pittsburgh, June 2-4, 1995. Both borrow heavily from my "The Latin American Studies Association vs. the United States: The Verdict of History," *Academic Questions*, 1994, 7 (3), pp. 40-55.

 The genesis of this work took place at Southern Illinois University in the summer of 1992, while I was a fellow at a National Endowment for the Humanities Summer Seminar for College Teachers, "Social Problems: the Constructionist Stance." Many thanks to Joel Best, Director of the seminar, and many others, too numerous to mention individually, who read the NEH paper or the *AQ* article and gave me the benefit of their comments, suggestions, and encouragement. The title of the present version is borrowed from Jeane Kirkpatrick's famous essay in *Commentary*, November 1979, pp. 34-45.

DICTATORSHIPS AND DOUBLE STANDARDS:
THE LATIN AMERICAN STUDIES ASSOCIATION ON CUBA

Alfred G. Cuzán

In "Dictatorships and Double Standards," Jeane Kirkpatrick, pronouncing President Carter's foreign policy a failure, located the cause of the debacle in "the blinding power of ideology." In the application of human rights as a criterion of foreign policy, the administration's "progressive liberalism" had produced a perverse double standard. Right-wing dictatorships of the traditional variety, such as that of Somoza's Nicaragua, which had historically been friendly to Washington, were being abandoned to Marxist-Leninist revolutionaries, even as overtures were made to "normalize" relations with Soviet-style regimes in Cuba and elsewhere.

But why would an American president apply a double standard which not only involved his administration "in the wholesale contradiction of its own principles," but whose practical effects were to undermine allies and legitimate enemies, thus violating "the strategic and economic interests of the United States"?

Because socialism of the Soviet/Chinese/Cuban variety is an ideology rooted in a version of the same values that sparked the enlightenment and the democratic revolutions of the 18th century; because it is modern and not traditional; because it postulates goals that appeal to Christian as well as to secular values (brotherhood of man, elimination of power as a mode of human relations), it is highly congenial to many Americans at the symbolic level. Marxist revolutionaries speak the language of a hopeful future while traditional autocrats speak the language

of an unattractive past. Because left-wing revolutionaries invoke the symbols and values of democracy--emphasizing egalitarianism rather than hierarchy and privilege, liberty rather than order, activity rather than passivity--they are again and again accepted as partisans in the cause of freedom and democracy.

Nowhere is the affinity of liberalism, Christianity, and Marxist socialism more apparent than among liberals who are "duped" time after time into supporting "liberators" who turn out to be totalitarians, and among Left-leaning clerics whose attraction to a secular style of "redemptive community" is stronger than their outrage at the hostility of socialist regimes to religion. In Jimmy Carter--egalitarian, optimist, liberal, Christian--the tendency to be repelled by frankly non-democratic rulers and hierarchical societies is almost as strong as the tendency to be attracted to the ideal of popular revolution, liberation, and progress. Carter is *par excellence*, the kind of liberal most likely to confound revolution with idealism, change with progress, optimism with virtue.¹

The double standard born of progressive liberalism which corrupted President Carter's human rights policy has its parallel in the political activities of the Latin American Studies Association (LASA). From the early 1970s to the end of the century, the Association pursued a Carter-style campaign for human rights around the Americas. On the one hand, it was invariably critical of right-wing assaults on academic freedom and, as one resolution had it, of "U.S. complicity therein." On the other hand, LASA was curiously silent when it came to the violation of human rights and the lack of academic

freedom in Castro's Cuba. Indeed, far from condemning the Castro regime, to this day LASA doggedly pursues "scholarly relations" with it in manifest contradiction of its own resolutions. This paper documents and analyzes LASA's double standard and its concrete application to the Castro regime (now in its 41st year, a Latin American record) mostly through the 1995 LASA Congress, which met in Washington, D.C. Nothing since then suggests that the Association's position has changed.

Founded in 1966, LASA boasts nearly 5,000 individual members. The association publishes a scholarly journal, the *Latin American Research Review* (LARR), and the *LASA Forum* (formerly the *LASA Newsletter*), a quarterly gazette of announcements, reports, analysis, and opinion. It is the *Forum*, which prints LASA's resolutions, task force reports, and related documents whose contents will be analyzed in these pages.

LASA is governed by an executive council consisting of nine elected members, including an elected vice-president (who automatically succeeds to the presidency), the president, and the immediate past president, plus three ex-officio members (the executive director, the LARR editor, and the congress program chairman). With the council's consent, the president makes appointments to task forces charged with specific missions. Two of the oldest, each more than a quarter of a century old, are the Task Force on Scholarly Relations with Cuba and the Task Force on Human Rights and Academic Freedom. It is in these and other task forces that most of LASA's official pronouncements and reports germinate or come to fruition. Another arena is the business meeting of the international congress, held every eighteen months. Here political resolutions are born, although official adoption must meet two conditions: (1) the business meeting at which they are approved must show a quorum, consisting of at least 10 percent of the attendance

at the congress and (2) ratification by the membership by mail ballot. While the latter has been, almost invariably, a foregone conclusion, the former has not been met in the last two congresses. Accordingly, an effort was recently made to lower the threshold to five percent, but this came to naught.

Like other learned societies, LASA became radicalized during the 1970s.² This radicalization resulted in the Association applying a double standard on human rights and academic freedom. On the one hand, LASA took to denouncing in impassioned language atrocities perpetrated by Latin American military regimes and, as one resolution had it, their "accomplice," the U.S. Government. On the other hand, the Association passed over in silence similar violations by Castro's Cuba and Sandinista Nicaragua, all the while taking the side of these regimes in their respective conflicts with Washington.³

As recalled by Ronald Chilcote of the University of California, Riverside, a self-professed radical who later criticized the Association for not going far enough in its denunciations of U.S. policies, the struggle for LASA's political soul started at a conference sponsored at the Latin American Center of the University of California, Los Angeles.

A series of prominent speakers, some conservative and some liberal or radical, had been invited to participate in what appeared to be a dull program of tedious talks organized one after the other in a format that precluded involvement of some one hundred participants. It was too much for the radicals in attendance who demanded that the conference be reorganized to allow for involvement of all. A confrontation with the organizers of the conference resulted in the restructuring of the program,

and two days of interesting dialogue ensued. The Union of Radical Latin Americanists [URLA] was born shortly thereafter, bringing together radicals on the West as well as East Coasts (*LASA Newsletter*, June 1973: 31).⁴

Flushed with success, URLA sponsored a series of resolutions at the next three LASA congresses. Two resolutions from the 1973 Madison, Wisconsin meeting put an imprint on LASA's political activities for the next two and a half decades. Resolution 1, "On Repression in Latin America and United States Complicity Therein," accused the United States of supporting, "through its police and military training program" and other assistance, such things as the abduction and murder of students and priests, internment and torture of political prisoners, exiling of dissidents, and the abolition of university autonomy in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, and Uruguay. Colombia, too, was accused of repressing "university professors with the purpose of destroying academic freedom." Resolution 1 directed the establishment of a "Committee on Human Rights and Academic Freedom which shall investigate and prepare reports on the above-mentioned situations *and any other similar situations* to be distributed to the LASA membership and to public officials and the mass media" (*LASA Newsletter*, March 1974: 9-10; emphasis added). Resolution 4, "On the U.S. Blockade of Cuba and Chile," "publicly condemned" the U.S. "economic and political blockade against Cuba" as well as the "invisible blockade" against Chile (which was at the time under the administration of Marxist president Salvador Allende). Resolution 4 provided for its own dissemination "through the major newspapers of the United States and other appropriate channels" (*LASA Newsletter*, March 1974: 12).

By the time these resolutions were ratified by mail ballot, Allende's government had been overthrown in a military coup. This turn of events persuaded LASA's Executive Council not to implement Resolution 4. In a letter to the LASA membership, Executive Council member Karen Spalding of Columbia University, sponsor of the resolution, explained:

My own reason for withdrawing the resolution passed is that subsequent events have proven that my understanding of the lengths to which U.S. corporations and the U.S. Government would go to achieve the overthrow of a government that was not completely subservient to their interests was limited and incomplete. While many of us sought to draw the attention of the U.S. public to the "invisible blockade" of Chile, which was instrumental in the deterioration of the Chilean economy, and asserted that this blockade was essentially the same as the blockade of Cuba, agencies of the U.S. Government were actively supporting the plans being made for the overthrow of President Allende.

Subsequent events have made it brutally clear that the U.S. Government is prepared not only to deal with government's representative of the most extreme forms of fascism and repression, but also to actively participate in their accession to power. The resolution I presented painted picture of economic advantage being used for political ends; it is now clear that the U.S. Government is prepared to use *any* ends to prevent the extension of socialism in the Americas. The growth of fascism in the Americas is consistent with and in fact part of the long term political

objectives of U.S. policy in Latin America. (*LASA Newsletter*, December 1973: 2; emphasis in original.)

The vote to ratify these resolutions was close. "On Repression in Latin America and U.S. Complicity Therein" received 402 votes in favor, 340 against, and 16 abstentions. The tally on "Regarding Government of U.S. Blockade Against Cuba and Chile" was 416 for, 326 against, and 16 abstentions. As a proportion of the vote, the resolutions passed by 53 percent and 55 percent, respectively. Somewhat less than half of the ballots were returned (*LASA Newsletter*, December 1973: 1).

Ironically, at about the same time as these resolutions were ratified, a majority of members, in a separate survey, disapproved of political resolutions.⁵ In September 1973, due to divisions in the Executive Council regarding the propriety of LASA adopting "resolutions of a political nature," a questionnaire was sent to the membership asking whether "concern with political resolutions" should or should not "be a part of LASA's activities." The "poll" was taken "only for informational and further discussion purposes," yet it elicited a near-record response: of about 1,600 questionnaires mailed, 865 (54 percent) were returned. The results were: 522 (61 percent) *disapproved* of political resolutions while only 329 (38 percent) approved and 14 (under 2 percent) abstained (*LASA Newsletter*, 1973: 26). This "poll" was the high water mark of rank-and-file resistance to LASA's radicalization. After that, the oppositionist tide quickly receded. The results of the survey notwithstanding, political resolutions continued to be proposed at every business meeting, approved by near unanimity of those present, and, in a turn-around from the contested votes of 1973, ratified by ever-larger margins, ranging from three-to-one to well over ten-to-one.

This is not to say that the entire membership was radicalized. In fact, participants at the business meeting have been but a fraction of those attending the international congress. As a proportion of the total, the number of ratification ballots returned never again exceeded 40 percent. In 1993, referendums on "Resolution on Violence Against the Academic Community in Guatemala" and "Resolution on U.S. Relations with Cuba," only about 500 ballots, representing less than 20 percent of the membership, were returned (*LASA Forum*, Winter 1993: 35). In other words, a majority of the membership fell silent. The meaning of this silence is not obvious, however. It is reasonable to suppose that at least some choose not to attend or speak out because they "have felt intimidated from expressing dissenting views on resolutions and motions presented at the business meetings," as the Executive Council argued when it changed the by-laws to provide for secret voting at the congress (*LASA Forum*, Summer 1984: 8). Furthermore, a few dissenters, including some with sterling scholarly reputations, issued scathing critiques of LASA's radicalization. For example, a letter by Abe Lowenthal and Jane Jacquette (who would serve as LASA President in the mid-1990s) complained that "the content and style" of business meetings motions and resolutions amounted to a "collective violation of professional norms," did damage "to the Associations's reputation for scholarly integrity," and reduced LASA's "scant chance to affect the real world beyond words by these rhetorical outbursts" (*LASA Newsletter*, September 1979: 2-3).

During his presidency, Jorge Domínguez noted that "many find appalling what goes on at LASA business meetings and may recoil as well from some of what passes for scholarship at our conventions." Confessing to "share the views of those who indict part of the convention's activities for being grossly unprofessional," he allowed that

. . . [O]ne of the darkest moments of my professional life in LASA was the Bloomington plenary meeting on Nicaragua. That meeting revealed appalling behavior for any audience, but it was even more scandalous for an audience presumably composed of academics. Specifically, the lack of minimal courtesy, and the expression of naked intolerance toward James Cheek, then deputy assistant secretary of state for Inter-American affairs, was damnable. (*LASA Forum*, Summer 1982: 1, 3.)

Nevertheless, minority dissent and majority silent notwithstanding, one thing comes across clearly in any careful reading of the *Forum*. From the early 1970s through the mid-1990s, among Latin Americanists who renewed their LASA membership and who chose to return their ratification ballots, a consensus solidified behind the radical's agenda. This agenda consisted in the application of a double standard. On the one hand, the universalism of human rights--including academic freedom--and the purity of scholarship were repeatedly invoked to condemn, and to avoid any type of contact with, rightwing military regimes, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the U.S. Defense Department. On the other hand, the very same standard was used, not to deplore the repression of intellectual freedom in Castro's Cuba or Sandinista Nicaragua, but to justify LASA's reaching out to these regimes for the purpose of establishing "scholarly relations."⁶

A motion at the 1976 Atlanta meeting, "A Reaffirmation of the Commitment of the Latin American Studies Association to the Universal Applicability and Necessity of Academic Freedom and Social Responsibility of the Higher Educational Community" reads as follows:

That the Latin American Studies Association reaffirms its beliefs that Academic Freedom is necessary for a free and progressive society, *in all nations of the world*, and, That the Latin American Studies Association reaffirms its commitment to the pursuit of truth as a social responsibility, and to the greater accountability of the academic community to the whole society, national and international, and That U.S. institutions and organizations representing academia and individuals acting on their behalf, should be ready to take all necessary steps to dissociate themselves from any actions and relationships with countries in which it is evident that massive and systematic violations of academic freedom have occurred *in order that such actions and relationships might not appear to condone these violations.* (LASA Newsletter, June 1976: 6; emphasis added.)

"Resolution on LASA Guidelines for Relations Between U.S. Scholars and Universities and Latin American Scholars and Universities Under Repressive Regimes" came next. Proposed at the 1980 Bloomington meeting and subsequently ratified by the membership, the "Guidelines" appear to be aimed, at least in part, at Latin Americanists who do contract work for the CIA. It reads in part:

1) Covert operations and covert sponsorship of open operations have no place in scholarly pursuits. For the sake of the integrity and effectiveness of the profession as a whole, LASA members must shun all projects the purposes and sponsorship of which cannot be openly acknowledged.

2) LASA members must struggle against censorship in all its forms, including the most subtle, most pervasive, and most threatening form of all: *Self-censorship*. We must guard against distortion of our own work and against the suppression by any public or private entity of information that should be in the public domain. And we must guard against giving credence to "disinformation."

.....

5) Honesty--not neutrality--is the guiding principle of scholarship. In Dante's vivid imagination, "the hottest place in hell is reserved for the man who in time of great moral crisis remains neutral." We must continue, therefore, to raise our voices against abuses of human rights throughout the Americas (LASA *Newsletter*, December 1980: 2.)

Even as LASA invoked academic freedom to shun the CIA, it used the same rationalization to build bridges to Fidel Castro's regime. Probably no country in the Hemisphere has received as much consistent attention from the Executive Council through the years as Cuba. Funds from the Ford Foundation have been used to finance activities of the Task Force on Scholarly Relations with Cuba, to pay for trips of LASA officers to the Island, for attendance by Cuban "scholars" to LASA congresses, and to organize small conferences in Havana. The "Cuba Task Force" is "among the most active of the Task Forces and one that involves many scholars from both its targeted area of interest and in the United States" (LASA *Forum*, Fall 1992: 16). (At the time of this writing, the Task Force is co-chaired by Lourdes Tabares of the University of Havana.) In the early 1970s and then again in the mid-1980s, when the U.S. Government did not issue

visas to Cubans wanting to attend academic conferences, LASA lobbied hard for a change of policy. When Cubans were permitted to attend a LASA congress, they were welcomed with "great pleasure" (*LASA Newsletter*, December 1977: 10), their "incisive contributions" to the discussions praised (*LASA Newsletter*, March 1978: 7).

LASA's pronouncements concerning Cuba have gone beyond the issue of "scholarly relations." Ever since Resolution 4 was ratified in 1973, hardly a congress has gone by without a motion or resolution adopted demanding that the U.S. Government cease its "hostility" to Cuba and establish full diplomatic relations with Fidel Castro's regime. The following is representative:

Whereas the U.S. government has pursued a policy of hostility toward Cuba;

Whereas the U.S. government is denying many U.S. citizens the right to travel to Cuba as tourists; and

Whereas professional scholars must seek special clearance from the U.S. government if they wish to do research in Cuba;

Therefore, be it resolved that the Latin American Studies Association urge the U.S. government to end its policy of hostility and to begin negotiations for the further normalization of relations between the two countries, including the lifting of obstacles to travel. (*LASA Forum*, Spring 1984: 3.)

In pursuit of "scholarly relations with Cuba," LASA officers have met with high officials of the Cuban Communist Party. Helen Safa, then president of LASA, reported that a three-member LASA delegation headed by herself had met in Havana "with several

members of the Departamento de America of the Central Committee of the PCC [America Department of Cuban Communist Party], with Armando Hart, minister of culture, and Rene Rodriguez, head of the Instituto Cubano de Amistad con los Pueblos" (*LASA Forum*, Fall 1984: 9). Be it noted that the Americas Department of the Cuban Communist Party has responsibilities in the area of covert operations,^s although I hasten to interject that I am not accusing Helen Safa or any other LASA current or former officer of engaging in subversive activities. My only purpose in quoting Safa on this point is to note the operation of LASA's double standard, one that called for the scrupulous shunning of the CIA and right-wing Latin American regimes but which was less than fastidious about engaging the one regime in the Americas that came closest to replicating the Stalinist model.

While in pursuit of "scholarly relations with Cuba," LASA has been uncharacteristically circumspect about the state of human rights and academic freedom in the Island. Through 1995, the Task Force on Human Rights and Academic Freedom had not published a single word on the subject. Here and there in the pages of the *Forum*, there are hints that LASA is aware of the lack of academic freedom in Cuba. In 1985, the *Forum* published a letter signed by Samuel Farber of Brooklyn College, Noam Chomsky of MIT, the writer I.F. Stone and twenty-two others calling attention to the plight of "Ariel Hidalgo, a Cuban leftist writer, historian and educator," who had been sentenced to from one to eight years in prison under the article in the penal code punishing "enemy propaganda."

The letter reads in part: "We believe that Hidalgo's trial, the law under which he was punished, and the prison conditions which he is currently enduring, fail to meet the

most elementary standards of human rights. Consistent with our stand in support of struggles for freedom and self-determination throughout the world, we ask the Cuban government to release Ariel Hidalgo, and any other persons whose rights have been similarly denied" (*LASA Forum*, Spring 1985: 6).

In response, Van R. Whiting, Jr., Cochair, LASA Task Force on Cuba, wrote to Ramón Sánchez Parodi, Head of the Cuban Interest Section in Washington, D.C. Because it is so rare for an officer or representative of LASA to say anything about human rights in Cuba in the pages of the *Forum*, Whiting's letter to Parodi is reproduced in full.

As you know, the LASA Task Force on Cuba is committed to the improvement of scholarly relations between the United States and Cuba. We are also charged with monitoring the conditions of human rights in Cuba, especially with relation to the scholarly community. For the most part, this function falls to another LASA group, the Task Force on Human Rights. But when a specific case is brought to our attention, we must demand a clarification.

The case of Ariel Hidalgo is a case in point. The enclosed letter, published in the *LASA Forum*, raises serious concerns about the conditions for academic freedom and for judicial process in Cuba. Freedom of opinion is essential for open scholarly endeavors. If the description contained in the enclosed letter is accurate, Ariel Hidalgo was convicted for expressing his opinions, not for taking any subversive action. The conditions of his trial suggest that he was not allowed to present an adequate defense. Finally, the conditions of his imprisonment

seem unjustifiably harsh. We ask that you make immediate inquiries into the case of Ariel Hidalgo. Given the conditions stated in Samuel Farber's letter, we call upon the Cuban government to release Ariel Hidalgo.

Let us take this opportunity to reaffirm our commitment to academic freedom, as well as our continued commitment to the expansion and improvement of contact between the scholarly communities of Cuba and the United States. (*LASA Forum*, Spring 1986: 36.)

The matter seems to have been dropped there, as nothing was published again in the *Forum* on the case of Ariel Hidalgo or those of countless other Cuban intellectuals and academics imprisoned for expressing opinions.⁹ As late as 1995, neither the Task Force on Scholarly Relations with Cuba, nor the Task Force on Human Rights and Academic Freedom, nor any other LASA officer had protested, in the style LASA reserves for other Latin American governments (or in any style, for that matter), violations of human rights and academic freedom in Cuba.

The closest a LASA representative came to speaking to political repression in Cuba again happened by way of a response by then-president Cole Blasier to a complaint from the U.S. State Department concerning a LASA resolution asserting that U.S. measures on travel between the two countries were more restrictive than Cuba's. The official had written:

It is astonishing that an organization composed of scholars interested in Latin America would make such as [sic] assertion. The closed nature of the Cuban system is too sufficiently known as to require elaboration here, but it should be clearly understood that Cuba exercises

complete control over all persons who would be permitted to leave Cuba to visit the United States just as it applies severe sanctions to those who seek to leave Cuba without official permission. It also controls carefully the admission of American scholars who wish to visit Cuba, as you are aware from a case at the University of Pittsburgh.

Blasier responded: "Almost all Latin Americanists of my acquaintance [sic] are familiar with the characteristics of the Cuban system which you correctly describe. Even so, the fact remains that U.S. visa policies are more restrictive than Cuba's in the sense that the United States refuses visas to most Cuban academics, while Cuba admits most U.S. academics" (*LASA Forum*, Spring 1987: 20).

That LASA would criticize U.S. policy toward Cuba for allegedly violating the right to travel while managing to say nothing about "the closed nature" of Castro's regime is, indeed, "astonishing." But that would not be the last time. Take, for example, the 1994 "Resolution on Ending the United States Embargo Against Cuba." It accuses the United States of having "built a wall between the two nations by banning travel and restricting cultural exchange with Cuba, preventing the free flow of people and ideas between two countries in contradiction with the principles of freedom of thought and civil liberties for all peoples" (*LASA Forum*, Spring 1994: 28). Regarding the absence of freedom of thought, freedom of travel, and civil liberties in Cuba itself, this as well as every previous resolution said nothing.

Since LASA's officers appear reluctant to discuss them in public, let us examine the "characteristics of the system" with which they are so anxious to maintain "scholarly relations." To begin with, the Castro regime is a four decade-old, one-party, one-man

dictatorship of the Stalinist type, complete with midnight arrests, physical and psychological torture of prisoners, show trials where the accused make abject public confessions or profess undying admiration for the maximum leader, summary executions, and hard labor camps.¹⁰ All media of communication, publishing houses, and cultural organizations are under the direct control of the party-state, as are labor unions and other forms of association. There is absolutely no freedom of expression or of assembly. Toleration for a handful of human rights activists waxes and wanes with international interest in their fate. When the world is looking the other way, they and other dissidents have been assaulted by mobs led or incited by plain clothes security personnel, pelted with garbage, dragged through the streets holding a sign reading "I am scum," in the style of China during the worst days of the Cultural Revolution, tried for disseminating "enemy propaganda" or practicing "ideological diversionism," and sentenced to prison. Time and again, foreign journalists, academics, and others who have provoked the regime's ire have been accused of being CIA agents and either expelled or refused entry into the Island.

The educational system, from the elementary grades through the university, is made of the same Stalinist mold. Throughout high school, there is a "Cumulative School Dossier" for every student. Here are recorded, in addition to marks and comments on purely academic performance, such things as the degree of political and ideological "integration" (e.g., membership in "mass organizations") of both students and parents or guardians. This information is used by university personnel to make decisions on admissions and scholarships, and to channel students into different careers. Only students with a "revolutionary" attitude are admitted to study social sciences, disciplines which are

heavily represented in LASA: "Chances for admission (especially to the study of law, economics, philosophy, political science, psychology, and the diplomatic corps) are especially affected by a student's demonstrated participation in communist youth organizations. For these disciplines, such criteria are much more important than the student's past academic record. . . ."¹¹

Once at university, the student is required to take courses in Marxist-Leninist philosophy, to do "volunteer" work, and participate in the "militia." More ominously:

Throughout his or her university experience, the student is aware of State Security's ubiquitous presence. There is an ample network of informants whose task is to ferret out opponents or dissidents. Even an apolitical student is not safe, for to be unengaged with the Revolution is to be suspect. For those who do not identify with the regime, the experience of studying in such a controlled and repressive environment is exhausting.¹²

The faculty does not fare any better. Tenure having been abolished, all professors are on yearly contracts. Most faculty have no more freedom to read prohibited works than do students or the general public.

Foreign newspapers, journals, and books which in any way challenge the reigning orthodoxy have been banned from public circulation. . . . Similar treatment has been accorded books about Cuba by eminent European or North American scholars. . . . There is an extensive list of materials to which access has been limited in university libraries. These have a so-called *fondo de reserva* [reserve fund] into which only those who have

been authorized by their supervisors and by the appropriate Communist party organization can delve. Even then, these books must be returned very quickly. The Jose Marti National Library has an entire floor of publications which are on "reserve" for the privileged few. . . .¹³

If merely reading heretical books is next to impossible in Cuba, writing them is downright dangerous. The aforementioned Ariel Hidalgo is a case in point. While a professor of "socioeconomics" at the Manolito Aguiar Workers' College, his writings were informed by a Marxist perspective. For a while, he enjoyed the favor of the regime. All this changed, however when

One day in April of 1979 he opposed an "act of repudiation" against a student who had asked permission to emigrate. (These acts are public humiliations instigated by the authorities.) As a result, he was dismissed from his teaching position and barred from continuing his studies. Like so many other pariahs in Cuba, he had to fall back on construction work, but he continued his studies in the evenings. In 1981 he decided to write an essay on the contradictions of Cuban socialism that has [sic] led to the creation of a new exploiting class. He was completing the essay when the State security police got hold of a copy and arrested him for its possession. . . .¹⁴

A copy of the manuscript reached Hidalgo's sister in New York. In it, Hidalgo argues that a "managerial ruling class" of Communist Party members rules Cuba. In his words:

The people, above all the youth, see an ever greater separation between a socialist theory that proclaims the equality of classes and well-being and a reality increasingly plagued by economic penuries and social inequality. . . . The administrators of all important businesses and enterprises in Cuba enjoy privileges that the working class is denied. How does one explain the existence of the lavish homes of these functionaries with their luxurious furnishings, their pantries bulging with many foods, their yachts, automobiles and sumptuous parties, while the majority of the workers must resign themselves to coping with deprivations under the guise of "proletarian austerity"? Foreign delegations are shown model schools and hospitals which are generally utilized by the families of the upper echelon; for every one of those centers there exist dozens more in wretched conditions which are utilized primarily by the children of the workers.¹⁵

In the face of this inequality, Hidalgo proposes a classically Marxist remedy:

In countries where there is managerial rule, the workers, under the leadership of an ideological and revolutionary minority, have to rise up at the sounding of the new herald in order to expropriate the superpower, that exclusive and universal exploiter, the State. To the pusillanimous, to those who believe that every sacrifice is in vain, to those who see human evolution as the vicious cycle of Sisyphus, we say: history does not stop. The sun of freedom may be eclipsed at each sunset, but it rises all the more radiant with each dawn.¹⁶

For writing these words, Hidalgo was sentenced to eight years in prison, of which he served seven before he was released to go to Miami. His case is hardly unique. A similar fate befell Ricardo Bofill, until his arrest in 1968 a professor of philosophy at the University of Havana.¹⁷ The only thing unusual about Ariel Hidalgo is that, his fate having been called to its attention by some prominent leftist intellectuals, LASA took brief note of him before lapsing into silence again.

The "characteristics of the Cuban system," then, are those of a totalitarian regime. There is no freedom to read, speak, or write. The mere act of putting down on paper words offensive to the regime is punishable by a long prison term. Like all other institutions, the universities must submit to the dictates of the party-state. As the slogan emblazoned on the gates of the University of Havana proclaims, "The university is only for revolutionaries."¹⁸

Yet, LASA steadfastly refused to raise its voice, as it did repeatedly throughout the Hemisphere, to condemn the repression of intellectual and academic freedom in Cuba. On one occasion, the Association even turned a deaf ear to demands from a delegation of Cuban-Americans, including several recently released political prisoners, that LASA take their side vis-a-vis the regime.¹⁹ In 1989, after a hurricane forced the cancellation of a scheduled international congress in Puerto Rico, LASA assembled in Miami. This is a city populated by hundreds of thousands of Cuban refugees, including many former political prisoners. Upon learning that a number of academics from the Island were going to attend the congress, a host of Cuban exile and Cuban-American organizations, led by the Society of Cuban Writers and Artists in Exile, held a press conference where they called on LASA to adopt the following resolution:

Cuba at the Crossroads of the Times

At times when the tide of freedom and liberalization is sweeping anachronistic structures in most of Eastern Europe, Cuba's totalitarian government has refused to contemplate any reforms that would compromise its absolute power.

It is evident that it is time for academicians specializing in Latin-America and attending LASA next week to join the growing international appeal for political reforms in Cuba, as evidenced by the call for a plebiscite signed by hundreds of intellectuals, scholars, artists, and leaders from all over the world last year, and, in consonance with the events unfolding in Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, East Germany and the USSR, to join us in demanding for Cuba:

- 1) Academic Freedom.
- 2) The resignation of the current Cuban leaders, who refuse to give the Cuban people their freedom, dignity and human rights.
- 3) A general amnesty for all political prisoners.
- 4) Free and multi-party election in Cuba.
- 5) The freedoms and rights guaranteed by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.²⁰

After a series of contretemps, including an attempt by LASA representatives to eliminate the demand for "the resignation of the current Cuban leaders," a three-member delegation attended the business meeting for the purpose of presenting their proposed resolution. The delegation included the writer Reinaldo Arenas (who had been

imprisoned by the regime), the philosopher and human rights activist Ricardo Bofill (also a former political prisoner), and the public intellectual Lillian Bertot (who holds a Ph.D. in Spanish Literature from the University of Florida). Bertot read the resolution to a hushed hall. When she finished, LASA President Paul Drake broke the silence by referring to the Task Force on Human Rights and Academic Freedom a suggestion that LASA consider recommending to the Cuban government that human rights be taught at the University of Havana.²¹

Regarding these events, a cryptic report appeared in the next issue of the *Forum*: Enrique Baloyra, who had participated in pre-meeting discussions with some of the representatives of the Cuban community in Miami, moved that the document to be read next into the record of the business meeting proceedings:

1. be received by the LASA Executive Council;
2. be submitted subsequently to the LASA Task Force on Scholarly Relations with Cuba;
3. and that the Task Force maintain contact with three individuals that were nominated by the group that formulated the document.

He also moved that the Task Force request a more precise document from the formulators of the document, and that the Task Force invite the government of Cuba to deliver a response, both documents to be made available for the next LASA congress.

[LASA President] Paul Drake further suggested that the document also be referred to LASA's Task Force on Human Rights and Academic Freedom.

Prior to the reading of the document, attendees were referred to a written statement formulated by the Sociedad de Escritores y Artistas Cubanos en el Exilio, "Cuba at the Crossroads of the Times," that has circulated widely throughout the past two days of the congress.

The document then read by Reynaldo Arenas, on behalf of the Sociedad de Escritores y Artistas Cubanos en el Exilio was an expanded version of that document, which was then turned over to Paul Drake for referral as indicated in Baloyra's motion (*LASA Forum*, Winter 1990: 13-14).

The text of neither "the document" nor "the statement" was printed, and nothing else was said in the *Forum* about them or what was resolved at this meeting. In other words, having parried a demand from Cuban exiles that it take a stand on human rights and academic freedom in the Island, LASA fell silent once again.

At the 1995 congress, which I attended,²² Professor Enrique Baloyra introduced a "Human Rights in Cuba" resolution, which read as follows:

Whereas the Latin American Studies Association has consistently denounced human rights violations and has asked governments to respond to allegations and/or change their behavior involving abuse of human rights; and

Whereas LASA is yet to publicly address the Cuban government on this matter;

Be it resolved that the Latin American Studies Association respectfully encourages the government of the Republic of Cuba to respond to the concerns expressed by many different groups and organizations about its human rights

policy, and that it remind that government that respect of human rights cannot be subordinated to political expedience.²³

Although I intended to vote for this resolution, I attempted to strengthen it with an amendment that would have added a bill of particulars against the Castro regime and brought LASA into compliance with its own previously expressed determination to “dissociate” itself from any country in which “massive and systematic violations of academic freedom have occurred in order that such actions and relationships might not appear to condone these violations.” My amendment read thus:

Whereas in Cuba there is no freedom of speech or of the press, no freedom to publish, no freedom to import books or other intellectual resources, no freedom to organize professional associations, hold seminars, conduct public opinion surveys, or carry out any form of independent inquiry into economy, society, and state;

Be it, therefore, resolved, that the Latin American Studies Association regards with utmost seriousness these violations of human rights and academic freedom and calls on the regime to cease such violations or risk the suspension of the activities of the Task Force on Scholarly Relations with Cuba.

My amendment died for lack of a second. At which point debate on the original resolution ensued. In quick succession, four or five attendees from the Island went to the microphone to speak against the resolution in almost identical words. They acknowledged that, indeed, there were violations of human rights and academic freedom in Cuba, citing, among others, arbitrariness on the part of the government and the imprisonment of political dissidents. Nevertheless, they added, this resolution was

inappropriate. Its passage would "complicate" relations between LASA and Cuba. In other words, should LASA have the temerity to take Castro to task on human rights, he just might retaliate by denying entry visas to Latin Americanists from the U.S. and refusing to allow Cubans permission to attend the next congress. Prof. Nelson Valdés of the University of New Mexico, organizer of many an excursion to the Island, also weighed in against the resolution. Citing Alexander Hamilton as his authority, he said that civil liberties are subordinate to national security. As long as the U.S. "blockade" on Cuba stands, LASA should not take up the issue of human rights. He promised that the moment the "blockade" was lifted he would be the first to propose a resolution on human rights in Cuba. Baloyra's resolution was rejected. Subsequent attempts to put LASA on record on the subject of human rights in Cuba have either been rebuffed, as in the 1997 congress, or died for lack of a quorum at the business meeting, as in 1999.

The foregoing analysis should be sufficient to establish that the Latin American Studies Association has applied a double standard when it comes to human rights, including academic freedom, in this Hemisphere. On the one hand, LASA has been almost lyrical in its declarations about the universal necessity of academic freedom, the obligations of U.S. academics to dissociate themselves from countries that suppress academic freedom, and the dangers of censorship, including selfcensorship. Furthermore, LASA has gone on record as regarding even minimal travel restrictions to Cuba imposed by the U.S. Government, such as the requirement that academics request special permission six weeks prior to departure, as an intolerable violation of academic freedom. On the other hand, as late as 1995 LASA still maintained a nearly perfect silence on the gross violations of academic and intellectual freedom in Castro's Cuba. And, far from

dissociating itself from a regime under which academics are not free to read or write as they please, LASA continues to pursue "scholarly relations" with it.

Having documented LASA's academic double standard when it comes to Cuba, the next step is to try to figure out why the Association engaged in such a perverse practice. To attempt a complete answer would be beyond the scope of this paper. Here only fragments of an answer are essayed. First, though, ignorance has to be discarded as a possible explanation. As Cole Blasier said, almost all Latin Americanists of his acquaintance "are familiar with the characteristics of the Cuban system." Ignorance being out of the question, the conclusion is inescapable that LASA has purposefully engaged in self-censorship, something that the 1980 Guidelines, invoking the hell of Dante's vivid imagination," vowed not to do.

Self-censorship is a logical outcome of the on-going "scholarly relations with Cuba." This is because, as is well known, the Castro regime does not tolerate criticism from any quarter. Foreign journalists, academics, and others who have dared to criticize it have found themselves expelled and unable to return. LASA's self-censorship, then, is one of the conditions implicitly or explicitly exacted by the regime for the maintaining of "scholarly relations." The question, then, is: Is it worth it? Presumably, "scholarly relations with Cuba" are a means to an end. For scholars, the end should be obtaining more or better knowledge or information about various aspects of life in the Island. But are the means conducive to the end? What, exactly, does LASA as an academic organization, or individual Latin Americanists, get in return for their silence? What knowledge or information are they able to obtain and make use of that would otherwise be unavailable, and how much does it improve individual or collective understanding of

Cuba? If the double standard is simply a cost of doing research, it would be helpful if someone were to do an evaluation of the addition to knowledge from visits to the Island by LASA officers and individual Latin Americanists, and from attendance at LASA congresses on the part of Cuban "scholars." Since, on their face, "scholarly relations with Cuba" violate LASA's own resolutions, and open the Association to the charge of hypocrisy, the additions to knowledge generated by those "scholarly relations" need specification on the part of those who carry them out and defend them.

But perhaps the assumption that "scholarly relations with Cuba" are a means to a scholarly end is incorrect. It could be that "scholarly relations with Cuba" actually amount to an end in itself, i.e., the making of a statement or the displaying of a posture of opposition to U.S. foreign policy. The fact that, in keeping with the 1974 resolution "On Repression in Latin America and U.S. Complicity Therein," LASA's condemnations of Latin American right-wing regimes and "counter-revolutionary" organizations were usually coupled with a denunciation of their "accomplice," the United States (see LASA resolutions on El Salvador and Nicaragua in, respectively, the *LASA Newsletter*, Spring 1982: 44 and *LASA Forum*, Winter 1987: 25), lends plausibility to this hypothesis. In other words, LASA's double standard may simply be another manifestation of the "adversary culture," a symptom of an alienated intelligentsia.²⁴

A related explanation would involve something akin to Kirkpatrick's diagnosis of the cause of President Carter's double standard on human rights, i.e., the "blinding power of ideology." What Tony Judt calls "the myth of revolution,"²⁵ which was alive and well among French intellectuals as recently as the 1980s, has also exerted a powerful influence on Latin American universities²⁶ and, by extension, Latin Americanists.²⁷ It may very well

be that, paraphrasing Kirkpatrick, nowhere is the affinity with the Castro regime greatest than among left-leaning Latin American Studies faculty safely tenured on U.S. campuses, whose attraction to the regime's revolutionary mythology is stronger than their outrage at its hostility to academic freedom and civil liberties.

NOTES

1. Jeane Kirkpatrick, "Dictatorships and Double Standards," *Commentary*, November 1979, p. 42.

2. See Ira Eli Wessler, *The Political Resolutions of American Learned Societies*, doctoral dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty of Arts and Sciences, New York University, 1973. For previous studies of LASA's radicalism, see William Ratliff, "Latin American Studies: Up from Radicalism?," *Academic Questions*, 3 (1), 1989-90, pp. 60-74 and Robert A. Packenham, *The Dependency Movement: Scholarship and Politics in Development Studies* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992). When I say that LASA became radicalized, I mean that the Association was afflicted by a combination of three things. One, it became politicized, going beyond the usual scholarly analysis that is of interest mostly to academics to take publicized positions on policy issues of the day, seeking to influence their outcome. Two, that those political activities were carried out in an uncivil atmosphere that was intolerant of dissent. Finally, that the content of those positions were consistently "very leftist" (see Webster's 1983 edition).

3. This paper focuses mainly on LASA's activities regarding Castro's Cuba. For an analysis of the Association's relations with Sandinista Nicaragua, see my "The Latin American Studies vs. the United States: The Verdict of History," *Academic Questions*, Summer 1994, pp. 47 ff.

4. Here's how a founding member of the Association recalls the 1970 meeting: "I was present at the 1970 LASA conference in Washington when Chilcote and several others interrupted the proceedings with loud shouting. LASA's president at the time, historian John J. Johnson of Stanford, could not restore order without calling on the hotel security forces to restrain the few who were most vociferous." Telephone conversation with Marvin Alisky, October 22, 1993. Compare Alisky's account with what transpired a year earlier at the American Economic Association business meeting: ". . . a group of twenty-five dissenters, members of the Union for Radical Political Economics, pushed their way onto the speaker's platform and denounced their more conservative colleagues as 'sycophants of inequality.' After order was restored, the members approved a sense of the meeting motion censuring the United States Department of State for refusing to grant a visa to the Marxian economist Mandel who had been invited to give a series of lectures in the United States." See Wessler, *op. cit.*, p. 166.

5. Wessler reported a similar paradox regarding the American Sociological Association. Between 1967 and 1968, the ASA membership was simultaneously polled, on the one hand, on whether they agreed with a resolution demanding "an immediate end to the bombing of Vietnam and the immediate withdrawal of American troops from South Vietnam" and, on the other, on the propriety of political resolutions. While "an overwhelming majority believed that the ASA, as a professional and scientific body,

should not take a position on the resolution," a majority of members did support it. See Wessler, *op.cit.*, p. 207.

6. It was, in fact, over this issue that LASA joined a suit against the U.S. government which suggested the title for the *Academic Questions* essay. In 1986, following "approximately a dozen separate incidents of [U.S.] Customs [Service] harassing travelers [returning from Nicaragua], including the seizure and photocopying of scholars' research materials, personal journals, address books, and draft news articles," LASA joined a suit initiated by the Center for Constitutional Rights. A federal judge ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, and the government declined to appeal. See *LASA Forum*, Fall 1986: 11 and Fall 1989: 3. Subsequently, the then-chairman of the Task Force on Scholarly Relations with Cuba, Wayne Smith, who headed Jimmy Carter's Interest Section in Havana, encouraged civil disobedience to protest the U.S. Government's travel restrictions to Cuba. According to LASA President Cynthia McClintock,

On November 30, in an act of civil disobedience, Wayne [Smith] and three other LASA members (Phil Brenner, Jean Handy, and John Nichols) traveled to Cuba without seeking Treasury Department licenses. In Havana, they met with scholars at the University of Havana. Upon their return, they were interrogated by Treasury Department agents. The delegation was accompanied by a lawyer from the Center for constitutional Rights; a key goal is to launch a legal challenge against the administration's regulations. Our expectation is that delegations will travel to Cuba in monthly defiance of the restrictions. (*LASA Forum*, Winter 1995: 3-4.)

7. I put the word in quotation marks because in a Stalinist regime scholarship as an autonomous endeavor is problematic, at best. The norm is for political considerations to compromise academics into self-censorship, parroting the official line, or even denouncing ("repudiating," as the official lingo puts it) non-conforming colleagues, a Stalinist practice (see Robert Conquest, *Reflections on a Ravaged Century* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2000), p. 100). Furthermore, travel abroad is a privilege granted to those believed to be loyal, but on whom the regime keeps tabs anyway with one or more political officers introduced into their ranks. Those traveling alone are aware that, if they defect, it will be years before they can see their loved ones again. LASA, though, proceeded publicly to treat every Cuban affiliated with a university or research institute as a bona fide scholar, and to chastise the U.S. Government when it did not agree.

8. Rex Hudson, *Castro's America Department* (Washington, D.C.: The Cuban-American National Foundation). Originally published in *Terrorism: An International Journal*, 9 (2), 1987: 125-67. See also Andrés Oppenheimer, *Castro's Final Hour. The Secret Story Behind the Coming Downfall of Communist Cuba* (New York: Simon & Schuster), p. 196.

9. Eventually, Hidalgo was released and went into exile. On the fate of Cuban intellectuals, see Carlos Ripoll, *Harnessing the Intellectuals. Censoring Writers and Artists in Today's Cuba* (Washington, D.C.: The Cuban American National Foundation,

1985. Originally published by Freedom House under the title, *The Heresy of Words in Cuba*). See also Eusebio Mujal-León, *The Cuban University Under the Revolution* (Washington: D.C.: The Cuban American National Foundation, 1988); Heberto Padilla, *La Mala Memoria* (Barcelona: Plaza & Janes Editores, S.A., 1989); and Robert E. Quirk, *Fidel Castro* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1993), Ch. 21 "Outside the Game" and Ch. 24 "Poets and Prisoners."

10. See Oppenheimer, *op.cit.*; Padilla, *op.cit.*; Quirk, *op. cit.* See also Juan Clark, Angel De Fana, and Amaya Sanchez, *Human Rights in Cuba. An Experiential Perspective*. A Publication of the Research Institute for Cuban Studies, North/South Center, University of Miami (Miami: Saeta Ediciones, 1991); Jorge Edwards, *Persona Non Grata* (Barcelona: Ediciones Grijalbo, 1973); Jean-Francois Fogel and Bertrand Rosenthal, *Find de Siglo en La Habana* (Bogota: TM Editores, 1994); Carlos Franqui, *Vida, Aventuras y Desastres de un Hombre Llamado Castro* (Barcelona: Editorial Planeta, 1988); Pierre Golendorf, *7 Años en Cuba. 38 Meses en las Prisiones de Fidel Castro* (Barcelona: Plaza y Yanes, 1978); Roberto Luque Escalona, *Fidel: El Juicio de la Historia* (Merida: Editorial Dante, 1990); Carlos Ripoll, *Los Fundamentos del Estalinismo en Cuba* (Miami: Granada Art Services, 1990); Armando Valladares, *Against All Hope. The Prison Memoirs of Armando Valladares* (New York: Ballentine Books, 1986); and Jorge Valls, *Twenty Years & Forty Days. Life in a Cuban Prison* (New York: Americas Watch, 1986).

That such violations have not ceased is evident from the following account from Human Rights in the World: AIn 1999, the government placed several dissidents on trial and arrested dozens of independent journalists and activists. On March 15, 1999, a Havana court sentenced four leaders of the Internal Dissidents' Working Group (Grupo de Trabajo de la Disidencia Interna, GTDI) to several years of imprisonment for >acts against the security of the state= based on their alleged incitement of sedition. In June 1997, the GTDI released >The Homeland Belongs to All=(La Patria es de Todos), a paper that analyzed Cuba's economy, proposed reforms to the Cuban Constitution, discussed human rights, and challenged Cuba's exclusive recognition of one political party. The trial followed nearly nineteen months of pretrial detention in maximum security prisons for the four, economists Martha Beatriz Roque Cabello and Vladimiro Roca Antúnez, engineering professor Félix Antonio Bonne Carcasses, and attorney René Gómez Manzano. The trial was closed to the public, the press, and international observers. Only nine of the dissidents' family members were allowed to attend. The court forbade Gómez Manzano, the leader of a group of independent attorneys whom the government had previously disbarred, from defending himself. The court sentenced Roca Antúnez to five years, Bonne Carcassés and Gómez Manzano to four years each, and Roque Cabello to three and a half years.@ The complete report is available at: <http://www.hrw.org/wr2k/americas-04.htm>

11. Mujal-Leon, *op.cit.*, p. 31. See also Clark et.al., *op.cit.*, pp. 38-44.

12. Mujal-Leon, *op.cit.*, p. 33.

13. *Ibid.*, p. 34.

14. Carlos Ripoll, *Harnessing the Intellectuals*, p. 39.

15. Quoted in *Ibid.*, p. 40.

16. Quoted in *Ibid.*, p. 41.

17. *Ibid.*, pp. 41-44. See also Mujal-Leon, *op.cit.*, pp. 38-39. Be it noted that, to this day, in response to international requests or pressure, the Castro regime sometimes releases political prisoners before the end of their terms, but only if they agree to leave the country. This is "an unacceptable option that violates Cuba's international human rights obligations," according to Human Rights Watch/Americas Executive Director Jose Miguel Vivanco. See *New York Times*, May 26, 1995, p. A4.

18. Mujal-Leon, *op.cit.* p. 36.

19. In contrast to LASA's silence, writers and artists the world over have periodically protested the imprisonment of their Cuban fellows. See Quirk, *op.cit.*, p. 671, and Padilla, *op.cit.*, pp. 199-202. See also "Open Letter to Fidel Castro," signed by well over a hundred artists, writers, poets and other distinguished figures from the world of arts and letters, including several Nobel Prize winners. The letter called on Castro to borrow a page from Pinochet's book and hold a plebiscite on whether he should remain in power (*New York Times*, December 27, 1988).

20. Flyer from the Sociedad de Escritores y Artistas Cubanos, Inc., December 1, 1989.

21. Lillian Bertot, "Figuras y Tropos de la Opresión en la Obra de Reinaldo Arenas," in Reinaldo Sánchez (Ed.), *Reinaldo Arenas: Recuerdo y Presencia* (Miami: Ediciones Universal, 1994), pp. 63 and 71-72.

22. Some background about my participation at this congress is in order. Upon returning to Pensacola in the fall of 1992, I renewed my LASA membership (which had lapsed long before) and had a letter published in the *Forum* calling attention to the *Academic Questions* article cited on the first page of this paper and urging LASA to speak to the Castro regime's violations of human rights and academic freedom. I received several letters from readers asking for copies of the *AQ* article. Also, I corresponded briefly with the then-chairman of the Task Force on Human Rights and Academic Freedom. Prior to the 1995 Washington congress, the Endowment for Cuban Studies mailed a copy of the version of this essay which they published to all LASA members. I attended the business meeting in the hope that LASA would at last judge the Castro regime by the same criteria it had condemned right-wing dictatorships. It was not to be. Afterwards, I let my membership lapse once again and have not attended another congress since.

23. From a copy distributed at the meeting. Curiously, the resolution was endorsed by several former LASA presidents, but none spoke in its favor. At least one did not even show up for the debate, although he was present at the congress.

24. Paul Hollander, *The Survival of the Adversary Culture* (New Brunswick: Transaction, 1988) and, by the same author, *Anti-Americanism. Critiques at Home and Abroad* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992) and *Political Pilgrims: Travels of Western Intellectuals to the Soviet Union, China, and Cuba, 1928-1978* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981). See also Elie Kedourie, "Politics & the Academy," *Commentary*, August 1992, pp. 50-55; Gary Saul Morson, "What is the Intelligentsia? Once More, an Old Russian Question," *Academic Questions*, 6 (3), Summer 1993, pp. 20-38; and Robert Conquest, *op.cit.*, especially chapters VI and VII.

25. Tony Judt, *Past Imperfect: French Intellectuals, 1955-56* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), p. 294. Robert Conquest laments the persistence to this day of an adolescent revolutionism, one of the unfortunate afflictions to which the human mind was and is prone to (*op.cit.*, pp. 294-295).

26. Timothy P. Wickham-Crowley, *Guerrillas & Revolution in Latin America: A Comparative Study of Insurgents and Regimes since 1956* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992). See, especially, Chs. 2-3.

27. On Latin Americanists' love affair with the Cuban Revolution and the Castro regime, see Irving Louis Horowitz, *The Conscience of Worms and the Cowardice of Lions. Cuban Politics and Culture in an American Context* (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1993).